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This thesis examines the force structure issues
effecting the Enhanced Fiber Optic Guided Missile (EFOG-M)
program. The major focus is to determine if the current
proposed force structure is the optimal solution and if not,
suggest a possible alternative solution.
Before the Army embarks on developing a new weapon
system to counter a known or suspected threat, it must first
go through a process known as requirements generation. This
process continuously assesses the capabilities of the
current force structure to meet the projected threat. The
output of this process, called the mission area analysis
(MAA) , is a deficiency between the current capability and
the threat. Once a deficiency is identified the Army must
then explore possible changes to it's organization,
leadership, doctrine, tactics, and training to determine if
any of these non-material alternatives can counter the
deficiency. These non-material alternatives are considered
first because of their low cost and ease of implementation.
If it is determined through a thorough analysis that the
non-material alternatives are incapable of resolving the
deficiency, then the Army must investigate a material
solution such as the EFOG-M. [Schmoll, p. 21]
The Army's Missile Command (MICOM) first developed the
Fiber Optic Guided Missile (FOG-M) technology in 1982. From
that time until 1985 several Army schools showed interest,
but no proponent claimed ownership until the Infantry School
developed the Anti-Armor Weapon System-Heavy (AAWS-H)
requirement as a follow-on replacement for the Tube-
Launched, Optically-Tracked, Wire Command-Link Guided (TOW)
missile. The AAWS-H concept required six Long Range Anti-
Tank (LRAT) and six Kinetic Energy Missiles (KEM) systems to
be employed in Echo Companies of Mechanized Infantry
Battalions. The 10 kilometer FOG-M was considered at that
time to be the leading candidate for the LRAT component.
[NLOS-CA, p. 1]
In August of 1985, the Air Defense School's Sergeant
York program was canceled leaving an unanticipated gap in
the Army's Air Defense Artillery (ADA) capabilities. In
January of 1986, the Forward Area Air Defense System (FAADS)
initiative began which laid out a system of three ADA weapon
components: Line Of Sight Forward Heavy (LOS-F-H) , Line Of
Sight Rear (LOS-R) , and the Non Line Of Sight (NLOS) . The
candidate selected for the ADA NLOS component was the FOG-M
system. [CEP, p. 1-1]
In Late 1986 it was determined by Army Training and
Doctrine Command (TRADOC) that the FOG-M system should have
the added capability to destroy enemy armor and at longer
ranges, allowing a dual use capability between ADA and
Infantry. Because of the Army's previous decision to remove
the FOG-M as a main component of it's overall anti-armor
plan, congressional language in the 1987 appropriations bill
threatened to withhold money from the FOG-M program until
the Army placed the system back into the plan. Thus, in
August of 1988, the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) approved
a Milestone II decision to go ahead with full scale
development. With the Air Defense School leading the
project, a Full Scale Development (FSD) contract was awarded
to the Boeing/Hughes team in early 1989. Approximately one
year later, the Boeing/Hughes team began to experience
significant difficulties with cost overruns and shortly
thereafter the contract was terminated. [NLOS-CA, p. 2]
Since the cancellation numerous efforts have been made
to revive the program. With the Infantry School back as the
chief proponent, the Enhanced Fiber Optic Guided Missile, is
currently being developed as part of the Rapid Force
Projection Initiative Advanced Concept Technology
Demonstration (RFPI ACTD) . The RFPI ACTD will consist of a
large scale Advanced Warfighting Experiment in Fiscal Year
(FY) 98 followed by an extended users evaluation period in
FY 99-00. In May of 1995 the U.S. Army awarded Raytheon
Electronic Systems a $39.5 million contract for the ACTD
program with options for an additional $100 million. [Allen,
p. 1]
With the Infantry School in the lead as the main
proponent, today's EFOG-M system is envisioned as a multi-
purpose, area precision kill weapon mounted on a M1097 Heavy
High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) . The
primary mission of the EFOG-M is to engage and destroy
threat armored combat vehicles, other high value ground
targets, and hovering or moving rotary wing aircraft at
ranges up to 15 kilometers. Figure 1 provides a graphical
depiction of the EFOG-M.
?A»« ' (55 Jk>S»»r
Figure 1. EFOG-M System. [Raytheon, p. 2]
The system consists of a gunner's station, a tactical
missile, and a fiber optic datalink. The datalink allows the
gunner to guide the missile to the target using automatic or
manual procedures. The EFOG-M system uses an imaging sensor
in the missile for target acquisition and terminal homing.
The image is transmitted from the missile to a gunner in the
launch vehicle over the fiber optic datalink which pays out
as the missile flies toward the target area. The missile
then receives steering signals back through the datalink
from the gunner's station. The gunner performs target
selection and acquisition on a video screen and locks the
automatic tracker onto an image of the target displayed on
his console. The tracking commands are then sent to a
ground station computer which sends steering commands back
up the datalink to steer the missile to the designated
target. The gunner has the option to take over from the
computer at any point during flight and steer the missile
manually. A key feature of this system is that it allows
the crew to fire missiles from defilade or concealed
positions, making it difficult for the enemy to locate
launch sites, thus enhancing soldier survivability.
[Raytheon, p. 1]
B. OBJECTIVES
The objectives of this study are: (1) to identify how
force structures for new systems are developed within the
Army, (2) to determine if the current proposed force
structure is the optimal solution, and (3) to recommend a
viable alternative solution, if the current proposed





Is the current proposed force structure of the EFOG-M
system the optimal solution and does it maximize the
system's unique and diverse capabilities?
2. Subsidiary Research Questions
a. What is the history of the EFOG-M program?
b. What is the current force structure?
c. What is the current status of the program?
d. Are there a feasible alternative force
structures, not previously studied, that may better utilize
the capabilities of the EFOG-M system.
D. DISCUSSION
Force structure issues are common in the acquisition of
new technologies. New technologies such as the development
of the tank and airplane have always had to contend with the
force structure present at the time of acquisition. In some
cases, such as the EFOG-M, it has been a painstaking effort
to come to any consensus on how this system should be used
and what force structure should support it.
The introduction of fiber optic technology to the
modern battlefield promises to revolutionize current
doctrine and address a new dimension of battle. Fiber optic
technology may give tomorrow's military the ability to
direct precision fires against NLOS targets. The United
States Army' s development of this system and the various
proposed force structures are somewhat unique, but not
unfamiliar in terms of other historical examples. Unless
the Army can decided on how to best utilize this new
technology in terms of force structure, the program may
again fall victim to budgetary constraints and risk
cancellation.
E . SCOPE
This thesis is based on proposing a possible
alternative force structure for the EFOG-M program. I plan
to conduct a case study of the EFOG-M program, which
examines the history, current proposed force structure, and
the threat. In addition, I will compare an alternate force
structure with the current force structure to determine the
most practical solution.
F. METHODOLOGY
Initially, I will conduct an in-depth study of the
available literature on the EFOG-M program. This will allow
me to gather data necessary to provide an historical
perspective. In addition, it will set the stage for
discussion and analysis of the current force structure.
Next, I will conduct intensive interviews with
personnel directly involved with the program and force
structure issues. This will allow me to compare the current
force structure against the national threat and possible
alternative
.
Finally, from this examination, I will attempt to
determine if the current proposed force structure is the
optimal solution and if not, recommend a viable alternative.
G. ORGANIZATION
The organization of this thesis includes an
introduction and background of the EFOG-M. Chapter II
provides general background information, discusses the
current threat and proposed force structure. Chapter III
will analyze the strengths and weaknesses of the current
proposed force structure and discuss how these can assist or
impede the program's acquisition. Chapter IV will propose
an alternative solution and compare it against the current
solution. Chapter V presents conclusions drawn from this





The need for effective anti-armor weapons within the
U.S. Army is continuously growing, proportionally to often
well equipped threat forces. More and more third world
nations are equipping themselves with the latest and best
armored vehicles that money can buy. These vehicles include
heavy, medium, and light tanks, infantry fighting vehicles,
and armored personnel carriers (APCs) . Our rapid deployable
light forces currently do not have the necessary "punch
power" to effectively deal with the majority of these threat
vehicles. This was recently highlighted during Desert
Shield, where the 82nd Airborne, was referred to as "speed
bumps". (PM Briefing, p. 2) This statement was made
primarily because the 82nd lacked the required weapons to
defeat heavy armored forces. Positioned without an
effective method to stop large armored columns from
advancing, the 82nd was in a less then favorable position.
Fortunately, they were not put to the ultimate test.
Applying the lessons learned from the Gulf War, the U.S.
Army realized that in the future, if it was placed into
similar situations it would require new technologies and
rapid deployable weapons to assist in defeating threat
forces
.
This chapter will examine the world threat which has
evolved after the collapse of the former Soviet Union.
Additionally this chapter will discuss Force XXI, the Army's
vision for it's future force structure, and examine the
concepts of battle command and battle space. Both concepts
are key components to Force XXI and will have a significant
impact on the development of the Army's new force structure,
as well as the force structure for the EFOG-M. Finally this
chapter will provide the reader with a more in-depth look at
the EFOG-M system by providing a chronological history of




The U.S. Army faces a very unstable, ever changing, and
extremely complex threat scenario. The collapse of the
Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War as well as advances
in technology, a move to a more global economy, and the
advent of the information age have made traditional means of
defining the threat inadequate. The old threat, a well
defined enemy with a known amount of weapons, armored
vehicles, and men has given way to a new, often undefined
threat
.
This new threat is promulgated by the proliferation of
weapons and technology, which is allowing potential
adversaries and developing nations to rapidly improve and
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modernize their armed forces. Most of these third world
countries are purchasing extremely sophisticated, state of
the art weaponry that could match, counter or defeat many of
the weapons the U.S. Army posses. As the number of countries
who modernize continues to grow, so does the threat to the
U.S.
The threat the U.S. is currently facing ranges from
simple to complex in scope, doctrine, organization,
training, material, leadership, and soldiers. TRADOC
Pamphlet 525-5 breaks down today' s threat into two distinct
categories, Non-Nation and Nation. Non-Nation threats
consists primarily of international crime organizations,
drug cartels, radical religious organizations, and
terrorists groups. These Non-Nation threats are steadily
increasing in number and complexity. Because of the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, these
organizations can quickly become a major threat to the U.S.
security both internally and abroad. (TRADOC Pam 525-5, p.
2-3)
The other category of threat, Nation, can be broken
down into four distinct subcategories; international
security forces, infantry armies, armored-mechanized
armies, and complex armies.
Internal security forces, in the majority of cases, are
relatively small, poorly trained, and inadequately equipped.
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They may be able to provide internal security for their
respective countries, but they are unable to adequately
defend their borders or conduct any type of extended
military operation.
Most of the less developed world's armies fall into the
second category, infantry armies. These armies have some
armor, but it is few in number and antiquated. They rely on
relatively cheap dismounted infantry for the bulk of their
combat power. These armies possess extremely low-technology
and have a very marginally, at best, capability to conduct
combined arms operations.
The majority of all industrial nations fall into the
third class referred to as armor-mechanized armies. These
nations typically mount approximately 40 percent of their
forces in armored vehicles. The composition of their
armored forces varies, while some have state of the art
weaponry, others are still utilizing outdated equipment, and
most share a variety of different types of vehicles.
Although these armies are different in many ways, they do
share a few similar characteristics. First, they attempt to
modernize selected systems to match the best systems
deployed by their neighbors or potential adversaries, and
second, most use generally hierarchical command, control,
communication, and information (C 3 I) structures. Although
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these armies are not as advanced as armies from developed
nations, they attempt to compensate with quantity.
The last category consists of complex, adaptive armies.
These armies are from well developed countries and are
normally technically and tactically advanced. Usually
smaller in size they are often well trained and equipped.
These complex forces posses great flexibility to seize
opportunities on the battlefield as well as the ability to
adapt to dynamic situations. Military operations conducted
by these armies will involve increasingly high-technology
equipment, joint or multinational forces, precision weapons,
and enhanced situational awareness. (TRADOC Pam 525-5, p. 2-
5)
It is clear that the U.S. Army faces a wide spectrum of
possible threat scenarios and could face any one or a
multitude of these threats. The question to ask then is
which type of threat is the Army most likely to encounter?
This question is not easily answered. Some experts believe
that in the coming decades we will face all of these
threats, some simultaneously. Others argue that large scale
wars, such as Desert Storm, are a thing of the past.
In his book, Beyond The Soviet Threat, James Motley
argues that the U.S. Army must be prepared to fight all
known threats. However, he suggests that the greatest
potential threat scenarios are from third world countries,
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who posses predominately infantry and armor-mechanized based
armies. (Motely, pgs. 31-35) Motely states:
Most Third World countries are poor and heavily
populated; their potential for development varies
considerably, and they are becoming militarily
stronger. They often are politically, socially,
and/or ethnically divided. Nations that were
dismissed decades ago as insignificant military
powers now posses large stocks of modern weapons.
Libya, Iraq, and Iran are excellent examples. In
the early 1960s, Libya was an in significant
regional actor with a small force. Today, it is
one of the most heavily armed nations in the
world. Although the combat proficiency of Libya's
armed forces is not highly regarded, the size of
its forces and the quality of the equipment
represent a significant potential threat to U.S.
interests. (Motley, p. 38)
The armies of the third world cannot be taken lightly, they
are steadily increasing the size and lethality of their
forces. Today, at least 12 third world countries are
equipped with more than 1000 tanks and eight countries now
possess larger armies than the U.S.
Alexandar also makes a similar argument. He suggests
that the U.S. Army must be prepared for any contingency. He
states, "that the U.S. Military must have a ready basket or
toolbox of flexible, general-purpose forces and weapons with
the capability of responding to a number of challenges and
performing to a number of operations it might be called upon
to undertake". (Alexandar, p. 51) Clearly, in reference to
the threat spectrum, both of these authors are concerned
about a too narrowly focused Army. However both agree that
14
the majority of future conflicts or hot spots will be in
developing nations.
To meet the potential threats in the next decades, the
Army must be prepared to provide a force capable of rapid
projection anywhere in the world. No longer does the U.S.
Military have the luxury of maintaining huge forward
deployed forces to deter or quickly react to threats.
Faced with increasing budget constraints and a possible
force structure that may drop as low as 470,000 soldiers,
the Army must capitalize on its ability to rapidly deploy
well equipped forces. (Willis, p. 14)
The restructuring of the U.S. Army to a force
projection army in the face of the current threat spectrum
creates the requirement for highly lethal and survivable
forces to conduct early-entry and follow on operations. The
Operational and Organizational (O&O) Concept for the RFPI
ACTD, states that:
The U.S. Army must have the ability to rapidly
move lethal forces from the Congenital United
States (CONUS) to any destination and execute
military missions in a very compressed time frame.
These missions, as recent history has shown, will
probably require the early entry force to take
immediate offensive action which may result in the
entire campaign ending within days as in Operation
Just Cause. Currently, deployable forces must
rely heavily on direct fire, line of sight,
weapons to counter enemy forces, particular armor,
in the close battle. These forces need enhanced
capabilities to shape the close battle, and to







On March 8, 1994, Army Chief of Staff, GEN Gordon P.
Sullivan, unveiled a vision for building a force for the
21st century. He called this new concept, Force XXI. The
underlying philosophy of this vision is to transform the
Army from an industrial age to an information age force.
Although it is still not clear what this force will look
like, it is clear that this redesign will impact the current
force structure. The initial design of the fighting force
will most likely be centered around the division, then
expanded. However, this concept may be altered
significantly. (Conway, P. 11-13)
2. Battle Dynamics
In addition to impacting force structure, Force XXI
will also impact doctrine, techniques, and tactics. The
ability of commanders, at all levels, to see the
battlefield will drastically change the way the Army fights.
Leaders will have more accurate and timely information in
which to assist in decision making. The base document for
this concept is TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, Force XXI Operations.
This pamphlet describes the implementation of Force XXI and
examines a concept called battle dynamics. This concept
provides valuable insight on what the future Army will look
like and how it may fight.
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3. Battle Command
Battle dynamics is divided into two main components,
battle command and battle space. Battle command is the art
of decision making, leading, and motivating informed
soldiers. The ability to quickly move and process
information will significantly influence force organization,
command procedures, and staff operations.
The Army's vision of the future battle command is
called the Army Battle- Command System (ABCS) concept. This
concept relies on quality soldiers and information
technology. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5 describes this concept as
one that
:
Recognizes the inevitable coexistence of both
hierachial and nonhierachical, or internetted,
information processes. In the concept,
ABCS... will use broadcast battlefield information,
as well as information from other sources, and
integrate that information, including real-time
friendly and enemy situations, into a digitized
image that can be displayed graphically in
increasingly mobile and heads-up displays. (TRADOC
Pam p. 4-23)
This system will allow commanders at all levels to share a
common picture of the battlefield, limited to their
operational needs and requirements. This new method of
command will change the way a commander sees, reacts to, and
fights the battle. This should provide the commander more
reaction time allowing him to control or dominate a much
larger area of operations.
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4 . Battle Space
Battle Space, the second part of battle dynamics, is
closely associated with battle command. "Battle space is a
concept that facilitates the type of innovative approach to
warfighting required of leaders in future battles". (TRADOC
Pam 525-5, p. 7 of 23) Because Army units will be more
lethal and survivable, and be able to react quicker than
enemy forces, the battle space they currently operate in
will very likely be expanded. Platoon, company, battalion,
and division areas of operations will increase in size and
scope. The new smaller more effective units will be
required to dominate this expanded battle space with a
minimum number of soldiers.
The exact size of a units battle space will be
determined by the maximum capabilities of a unit to acquire
and engage the enemy. As new technologies are introduced
this battle space will continue to expand. Advances is
stealth, propulsion, suspension, optics, and lethality of
weapons will assist in this expansion. This expansion will
provide three distinct advantages for the Army.
1. More effective reconnaissance will allow units to
identify, disrupt, or destroy threat forces before they can
effectively engage friendly forces.
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2. Survivability will increase due to a more dispersed
force
.
3. It will allow the Army to conduct maneuver by
massing fires while maintaining the ability to rapidly move
forces to critical areas of the battlefield.
5. Deep and Simultaneous Attack
TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5 states "To dominate an extended
battle space will require agile and robust deep and
simultaneous attack capabilities. (TRADOC Pam, p. 9 of 23)
This new thinking will cause the Army to reexamine
relationships between units and their influence on the
battle. Depth and simultaneous attack will allow commanders
to directly influence the enemy throughout his battle space.
This is a critical component of Force XXI and will redefine
the current ideas of the deep, close and rear battle.
In order for U.S. Forces to win quickly and decisively,
commanders will have to fight the battle in all dimensions,
accomplish their assigned missions, and protect the force.
To accomplish this, commanders will extend the battlefield
in both time and space while maintaining a high degree of
situational awareness. They must be able to find and
identify the majority of enemy forces in near-real time.
Additionally, they must have the ability to strike and
defeat located enemy elements with precision and highly
lethal effects, in near-real time, and at the time and place




Fiber optic development began in the Army over 20 years
ago. From the early seventies, the Army was experimenting
with video transmission of images from model airplanes via
fiber optic cable to a ground station. The original concept
centered around a remotely piloted vehicle (RPV) that
collected intelligence and transmitted video pictures to the
ground. (NLOS-CA, p. 2) The concept grew and gave way to a
high speed payout of the fiber optic link from rocket
powered ballistic aerial targets. These early successful
tests focused on unidirectional transmission of video images
from the air vehicle to the ground. Toward the late
seventies, significant improvements in the fiber optic cable
allowed for the first time bi-directional transmission of
both video images and missile flight commands. These flights
confirmed the ability to control the missile from a ground
station while simultaneously providing real time video.
(Habayeb, p. 18-19)
In the early eighties, the U.S. Army Missile Command
Research, Development and Engineering Center initiated a
more powerful demonstration of a fiber optic missile. They
launched canister configured missiles utilizing soldiers to
control them instead of engineers. The test included 14
separate launches, firing at stationary and moving tanks as
well as hovering helicopters, at ranges up to 10
kilometers
.
(PM Briefing, p. 4)
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These highly successful tests generated a great
interest from the Army, but because this new concept crossed
so many mission areas is was difficult to find a single
proponent or sponsor. While viewed as a good system with
many capabilities, no one branch came forward to claim it.
After the cancellation of the Sergeant York Air Defense
Gun, in 1985, the U.S. Army Air Defense community expressed
a desire to utilized the technology offered from this new
fiber optic weapons system. While the Army was figuring out
how to implement this new Air Defense weapon system, Defense
Secretary Weinberger directed an Initial Operational
Evaluation (IOE) of the fiber optic missile. The thought was
that the IOE would give the Army some time to figure mission
requirements out, while concurrently missile prototypes were
being developed and tested. This plan fell victim to the
budget cuts of the late eighties and the program again
stalled. (NLOS-CA, p. 4)
As is typical in most programs, the military
requirement was much greater than the original development
concept, in fact many of the requirements pushed state of
the art technology. This caused cost overruns, effectively
killing the program. Even though the program was canceled
the requirement for a anti-armor system was still alive.
During the late eighties a renewed interest began, but this
time it was in combining both the anti-armor capabilities
with that of air defense against certain helicopter targets.
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Studies were conducted in order to determine the best use of
this system in the combined arms role.
The system as it stands today will be deployed at the
brigade level, with it's main purpose to shape or eliminate
the close battle. This new system exceeds the original
initial operational capability (IOE), but is not as
effective in both range and speed as when it was last
canceled. This decrease in it's capability was not due to
technology, but is due to trade-offs to keep the unit cost
low.
This system has several unique features which are not
found on more conventional line of site weapons. It can be
fired from a concealed position far from the target, making
it extremely survivable. The gunner will also have the
advantage of being able to view the battlefield as the
missile is under way. In addition, countermeasures are very
ineffective against this system. The unique ability of the
gunner to fly the missile toward the target from different
angles, significantly reduces the chance of detection and
counter battery fires. Additionally this weapon system can
also avoid fratricide. The gunner can always take action to
have the missile miss a mistaken enemy. The key to these
advantages lies with the fiber optic link, which allows the
gunner to fly with the missile and keeps expensive
components on the ground. This allows for a low unit
missile cost, which is extremely important given the past
22
history of the program and its financial constraints. (NLOS-
CA, p. 6-7)
2. Proposed Organization
The following information was obtained from the program
office in the form of a draft organization concept for the
NLOS-CA weapons system paper, dated 18 March, 1995.
The twelve system NLOS-CA company is earmarked as a
brigade level asset, operating as a separate company in its
parent brigade. The company consists of three firing
platoons of four NLOS fire units each, (see Figure 2) A
platoon consists of a headquarters and four firing
platforms. Each firing platform is a HMMWV heavy variant
chassis (HHV) operated by a gunner (either a 11H30 staff
sergeant who also functions as a section leader of two
firing systems or a sergeant) and an assistant gunner who is
also the vehicle driver (specialist 11H10) . The
headquarters includes the platoon leader and platoon
sergeant and two driver/radio operators, who operate the two
HHV s of the headquarters section. The platoon sergeant is
the platoon logistics operator and is responsible for the
platoon resupply. Both vehicles in the headquarters section
require two long range radios each.
The headquarters section of the company consists of the
commander, executive officer, first sergeant, communication,
supply and nuclear biological and chemical (NBC)
noncommissioned officers (NCO)
,
plus two controllers (one
sergeant first class 11H40 as senior controller and one
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staff sergeant 11H30 as controller). The headquarters will
also have an armorer, four heavy expanded mobility tactical
truck (HEMTT) cargo drivers (one sergeant and three
specialists) and two 77F HEMTT fuel drivers. Additionally
there are two driver/radio operators for the commander's and
executive officer's vehicles. The two controllers paired
with the commander and executive officer will provide a 24
hour operational NLOS command and coordination center. Both
the commander's and executive officer's vehicle will have
three radios, one for the brigade command net, one for the
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Figure 2. Company Wiring Diagram
The first sergeant and supply sergeant will function as
the company logisticians . The first sergeant's vehicle (a
HMMWV) will be driven by the NBC NCO and will be equipped
24
with one radio which can be used on the company command or
brigade logistics net to facilitate logistical functions.
The two HEMTT cargo vehicles will be used primarily for
missile resupply for the firing platoons. The HEMTT fuel
vehicle will provide petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL)
products to the platoons. Although the HMMWV is not
anticipate to consume large amounts of POL, the dispersed
tactical employment location of the firing platoons may
dictate delivery to a variety of locations and be time
intensive. Other resupply activities, such as Class I,
water, ect. will be the responsibility of each platoon
sergeant acting in coordination with the company first
sergeant and/or supply sergeant.
Normal logistics planning remains the company commander
and executive officer's responsibility. The NLOS company is
dependent upon the brigade headquarters and headquarters
company (HHC) for unit level vehicle maintenance, including
recovery and evacuation, personnel administration, messing,
and other normal support. The brigade HHC maintenance and
messing sections will be increased by a total of five
personnel spaces to accommodate this increased workload.
The NLOS company is dependent on the forward support
battalion's medical support similar to that provided to the
brigade HHC. When any element of the company is attached
out, the unit it is attached to assumes the support
responsibility, less that of missile resupply. (NLOS-CA
Organization Concept, P. 1-2)
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E. SUMMARY
The U.S. Army currently faces an extremely unstable and
expanding threat scenario. The proliferation of weapons
from the former Soviet Union and other nations make it too
easy for developing third world countries to quickly acquire
large armored forces. In order to meet this challenge, the
Army has developed a concept called Force XXI. This concept
will redefine the Army's force structure and the way it
fights. To achieve Force XXI goals, the Army must examine
new technologies, doctrine, and tactics and determine the
optimal mix to counter the threat. Inevitably, commanders at
all levels will be called upon to do more with less, forcing
the Army to redefine battle command and space. Chapter II
provided essential background information necessary to
examine force structure issues in relation to the EFOG-M
program. Chapter III will analyze the strengths and




Chapter III will focus on analyzing the strengths and
weaknesses of the current proposed force structure of the
EFOG-M system. To assist in that analysis some basic
understanding of the methodology used to determine how this
force structure was developed is necessary. Therefore, some
important historical documents that I feel are extremely
important in the evolution of the force structure will be
discussed. These early studies provide the framework from
which this force structure was built upon. Additionally,
opinions from experts involved with this system will be
utilized in the discussion where relevant.
B. HISTORICAL DOCUMENTATION
1. NLOS White Paper
In 1988 the Command and General Staff College (CGSC)
directed that a doctrinal analysis of the NLOS system be
conducted. That study came to be known as the NLOS White
Paper. The study evaluated and made the following
recommendations: (1) where the system should be employed and
how it should be organized for combat, (2) what command,
control, communication (C3) and computer software interfaces
are required, (3) how missiles would be allocated and
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Pact will remain the most serious threat to the U.S. Army
beyond the year 2015". (White Paper, p. 1) At this same
time the Army was almost twice it's current size with 18
divisions. In just a little over a year the Soviet Union
would collapse and our Army would face unparalleled
downsizing. These facts have made many of the study's
assumptions and recommendations invalid. Additionally, the
study focused on a NLOS with a maximum effective range of 25
KM. (White Paper, p. 5) The increased range over the
current system, makes the original NLOS system more
doctrinally suitable to be fought at brigade or higher
levels. With a reduced range of 15 KM and the fact that it
may be deployed 2-8 KM behind the forward line of troops
(FLOT) , the NLOS organizational structure needs to be
further evaluated. Even the White Paper recommended that
further analysis be conducted to confirm the doctrinal
recommendations made. (White Paper, p. 17)
2. Close Support Study Group (CSSG) IV
In response to the guidance contained in a letter of
instruction from GEN Maxwell Thurman, the TRADOC commander,
the Close Support Study Group IV was created. GEN Thurman
instructed the CSSG to examine the possibility of a direct
support, indirect fire support battalion - including 155mm
howitzers, 120mm mortars, and NLOS - organic to the brigade.
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Further guidance was given to the group in reference to NLOS
specifically. The group was instructed to develop an
employment concept that would maximize the impact of the
system on the battlefield. The CSSG examined various
organization considerations, roles, and proponency issues.
Recommendations were made where appropriate and suggestions
for further studies where required.
The most important findings and recommendations made by
the group are listed below. (CSSG IV, p. 4-1)
1. Separate organizations for air defense (AD) and
anti-tank (AT) NLOS. The group recommended that AT NLOS
organizations be established that are distinct from the AD
NLOS organizations.
2. Echelon for employment of AT NLOS in the division.
The CSSG found that 1) the battalion task force lacks the
access to real time targeting intelligence to fully maximize
and employ NLOS and 2) NLOS cannot be properly used in the
division commander's battle. Based on this and other
studies, the group recommended that the brigade be the
optimum level to command, control, and fight NLOS.
3. Branch proponent for AT NLOS. The group suggested
that NLOS is a fire support system that is fought like
artillery and therefore proponency for AT NLOS should be
assigned to the Field Artillery branch.
4. Organization for AT NLOS in the heavy division.
The group recommended that a battery, commanded by a FA
captain, be created and provided to each maneuver brigade.
In summary, the CSSG IV found that the AT NLOS system
is a weapon with the potential to have a significant
positive impact on the battlefield. They also believed that
it is a fire support system best controlled by the fire
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support C2 system and recommended proponency be given to the
Field Artillery. This study was conducted and concluded
while the CEP was beginning it's study efforts. Again, much
has changed that has made many of the findings and
recommendations no longer appropriate. For example, in
reference to echelon for employment, the group concluded
that the battalion task force lacked the necessary real time
targeting intelligence information to fully maximize the
potential of the NLOS.(CSSG IV, pgs . 4-5, 4-10) While true
at the time, the implementation of Force XXI and
technological advances will provide lower echelon units with
more than ample intelligence information to effectively
control the system.
3. Concept Evaluation Program (CEP)
Much of the information used to develop this chapter is
contained in the Combined Arms NLOS Concept Evaluation
Program (CEP) dated 1990. This is the latest version of the
CEP available. The purpose of the CEP was to experiment and
asses the NLOS warfighting concept laid out in the CGSC
White Paper dated 18 March, 1988. The CEP was commissioned
by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Combat Developments (DCSCD)
TRADOC to investigate the command and control (C2)
implications of NLOS and the anti-tank role. The main
objectives of this study were to (1) examine the ability of
the current and proposed C2 systems to manage NLOS target
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data and C2 requirements, (2) determine the best uses of
NLOS given C2 and weapon system capabilities and
limitations, (3) determine the best organizational level
(force structure) to employ NLOS, and (4) support a
proponency decision. (CEP, p. 4-1)
The CEP was based on using NLOS in both the Air Defense
(AD) and Anti-Tank (AT) roles. It was assumed that 18 NLOS
systems per division would be allotted to the AD role while
36 systems would be allotted to the AT role. The study was
also based on both a heavy and light scenario. The heavy
version was envisioned to be employed on a Multiple Launched
Rocket System (MLRS) chassis and have the capability to hold
12 missiles. The light version foreseen in the study was
similar to the current version. Another critical assumption
made was that the maximum effective range of the NLOS
missile would be 25 KM.
Using these assumptions and results from various other
studies that were conducted, the CEP concluded that (1) the
NLOS could operate in a dual AD/AT role and be effectively
controlled and synchronized by a centralized brigade cell,
(2) C2 would be optimized at brigade because of the C2
sensor data and integration assets at the brigade
headquarters, and (3) that there be a dual proponency with
the Air Defense School being the proponent for the NLOS-AD
and the Field Artillery School being the proponent for the
NLOS-AT. (CEP, pgs. 1-21 to 1-40)
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The recommendations, while well-founded at the time the
study was conducted, are somewhat less fitting today. First
the maximum effective range of the EFOG-M is 15 KM. The CEP
based it's recommendations on a system that could reach out
to 25 KM and even suggested that the NLOS be provided with
an extended range capability. This led to a false belief
that the system, that was doctrinally supposed to be
deployed between 2-8 KM behind the FLOT, would be able to
provide deep coverage for the brigade. The range
limitations of the current system make this a less viable
option and redefines the concept of deep and close battle as
discussed in this study.
Another issue that may have effected the
recommendations made by the CEP was the issue of proponency.
It is feasible that the current proponent of the system, the
Infantry School, was not correctly represented during the
analysis. The CEP focused primarily on AD and FA as the
proponents of the system and therefore, some of the
conclusions drawn from this study may be fallacious. For
example, out of all the various studies that the CEP used
only one, the study submitted by the Infantry School,
recommended that the NLOS be controlled at battalion level
as opposed to the CEP' s recommendation that it be controlled
at brigade. (CEP, p. 1-13)
Finally, the CEP stated that there was a need to
perform further analysis to (1) determine the number of
NLOS-AT reguired, (2) determine the optimal number of
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missiles required on a launcher, (3) develop the most
efficient NLOS-AT organization, and (4) examine a tradeoff
between the need for NLOS and the need for other anti-tank
systems in a combined arms approach. (CEP, p. 1-41)
In summary, at the time the CEP was conducted the
recommendations were based on known or believed
capabilities. Much has changed since this study was
conducted, however in spite of that little has changed
conceptually with regard toward force structure. Because
some of the original assumptions are no longer valid,
further studies are required to determine the optimal force
structure
.
C. STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF FORCE STRUCTURE
1 . Strengths
The proposed force structure offers numerous advantages
as pointed out in studies conducted to date. There are
however only two major advantages that stand out. These
advantages are (1) the added capability given to the brigade
commander and (2) the availability of intelligence
information.
a. Added Capability
The greatest advantage this structure offers is in
the added capability it gives the brigade commander. The
ability to influence the enemy before he can engage your
force is critical. If you can cause the enemy to react in a
way he has not planned for, you can control his actions or
shape the battle. Obviously the further away from the FLOT
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you can achieve this the more effective and advantageous it
will be. By establishing a separate organic EFOG-M company
at brigade, the brigade commander will have the ability to
effect the deep battle. He will be able to mass fires
against enemy forces at critical points on the battlefield.
This will give him increased flexibility when dealing with
counterattack forces or major units about to make a
penetration. In the attack it would allow the commander to
gain real time intelligence on deep targets while surgically
destroying enemy forces. Additionally, the brigade can
control fires across lower unit boundaries. For example, if
a counterattack force crosses a battalion boundary, the
brigade can continuously control and maintain effective
fires, essentially extending the effectiveness of the EFOG-M
system. (White Paper, p. 17)
b. Intelligence
The other major advantage that this structure
offers is in the intelligence area. To maximize the
effectiveness of the EFOG-M, it is essential that real time
intelligence information be available. The brigade is
currently the lowest level where real time intelligence is
available to adequately control the EFOG-M. Most previous
studies agreed that the brigade has the availability of
sensors that will provide intelligence at ranges required to
effectively control the EFOG-M.
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2 . Weaknesses
There are numerous weaknesses that can be associated
with establishing a separate organic EFOG-M company at
brigade. Some of the disadvantages such as cost, personnel,
logistics, training, and habitual relationships are inherent
in the proposed force structure, while others, such as range
and future availability of intelligence information have
come about due to rapid advances in technology.
a. Cost and Personnel
One of the most critical disadvantages that this
force structure offers is in the area of cost. Because it is
difficult to discuss cost without examining personnel, both
will be discussed simultaneously. The increase in cost can
be directly associated with both an increase in personnel
and equipment. Included in this cost are all the ancillary
costs such as personnel benefits, housing, medical,
logistical costs, ect. Establishing a separate company at
brigade will increase the Army's force structure by 53
personnel per EFOG-M company. (NLOS-CA Operational Concept,
p. 1) A key point to mention is that 17 out of the 53
personnel per company reside in the company headquarters





























Figure 3. Company Wiring Diagram.
The number of personnel quoted for each EFOG-M does not
include additional personnel required to plus up the brigade
TOC or other personnel increases such as administrative,
maintenance (at both the unit and direct support level)
,
cooks, and other support personnel.
The establishment of a 53 man EFOG-M company per
brigade will cause a significant burden on an already over
taxed force structure, especially in an environment
characterized by decreasing budgets and the possibility of a
reduction of 20,000 additional personnel from the Army's
force structure. This is a notable weakness that may be
extremely difficult to overcome. What branch will take the
necessary cuts to allow the Infantry a plus up? Obviously
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this will be a difficult question to answer by the Army's
force developers and leadership.
b. Logistics
Another disadvantage that this structure offers
lies within the logistical arena. Each EFOG-M company will
bring with it a large amount of organic vehicles and
equipment to support and maintain. With this increase in
equipment will come an increase in spare parts, tools and
test equipment at all maintenance levels. Will the brigade
be able to handle this increased logistical burden? Some of
the studies suggest that it will not be able to adequately
provide the necessary support to sufficiently maintain an
EFOG-M company. In fact the CSSG IV study stated "The
brigade headquarters lacks the assets to provide logistical
and administrative support'' ( CSSG, p. 4-23) and the White
Paper study suggested that "the brigade is not currently
organized to support an organic unit". (White Paper, p. 7)
More in-depth analysis needs to be conducted to determine if
the brigade, with minimal logistical assets, can handle this
new logistical requirement.
c. Training and Habitual Relationships
Other areas that deserve attention and can be
viewed as weaknesses are training and the concept of
habitual relationships. All Army units must have the
necessary support system available to adequately train for
their wartime missions. The brigade currently is ill suited
to train organic units. In fact, several studies cited this
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as a serious disadvantage for establishing a separate EFOG-M
company at the brigade. The brigade just does not have the
resources to allow a company to independently train it's
Mission Essential Task List (METL) to standard.
Another key issue closely tied to training is the
concept of habitual relationships. It is imperative that
units maintain a habitual relationship with units that they
support. The benefits derived from these relationships can
not be overlooked. Bonds are developed, leaders understand
each others strengths and weaknesses, and combat
effectiveness increases when units are allowed to build
these habitual relationships. The White Paper suggests that
"The only way combat power can be reliably and consistently
brought together is with units that train together on a
regular basis, and understand each other"
.
(White Paper, p.
17) This mutual understanding and shared base of knowledge
helps units to develop strong ties and perform to higher
standards. This philosophy was one of the main reasons why
the Army uses task force organizations today. Under the
current proposed force structure, the brigade commander will
assign EFOG-M platoons to units based on the factors of
METT-T. These assignments will most likely change with





Establishing an EFOG-M company organic to the
brigade offers both advantages and disadvantages. While it
is true that the brigade has the necessary intelligence
information available to effectively command and control
EFOG-M firing units, there are serious concerns regarding
some of the disadvantages previously discussed.
The main disadvantage, cost (to include personnel and
equipment) cannot be ignored especially in such a fiscally
austere period marked by the possibility of further
personnel reductions. The EFOG-M program has had a long
history of problems, most associated with uninterested users
and cost. If this technology is to be successfully inserted
into the Army's force structure it will be extremely crucial
that it be done in the most economical manner without
reducing the combat effectiveness this system offers.
Finally a precarious weakness associated with this
concept lies within the studies themselves. Most of these
studies are outdated. Many of the assumptions used in the
formulation of these studies are inaccurate causing some of
the recommendations to be no longer valid. This information
combined with the numerous disadvantages discussed make the
establishment of a EFOG-M company organic to the brigade a
significantly less practicable option.
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D. CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter discussed some of the key studies
conducted on the EFOG-M that were instrumental in the
development of the proposed force structure. Background
information, individual recommendations, and discussion of
assumptions were provided for each study. These studies
were used to lay the framework for the discussion of the
proposed strengths and weaknesses. The proposed force
structure has definite advantages, but through time many
have become overshadowed by the growing number of
disadvantages. Chapter IV will present alternative force
structures, analyze their strenghts and weaknesses, and
compare them against the current structure.
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IV. ALTERNATE FORCE STRUCTURES
A. INTRODUCTION
Chapter III discussed some of the most significant
strengths and weaknesses associated with the current
proposed force structure. This chapter will present two
alternative force structures and discuss the relevant
advantages and disadvantages of both. Course of action (COA)
one is a composite (TOW/EFOG-M) anti-tank platoon (see
Figures 5 and 6) while COA two advocates the creation of a
separate EFOG-M platoon organic to the battalion. Both
courses of action offer significant advantages over the
current proposed force structure, which hereafter will be
referred to as the base structure. Because both courses of
action advocate a platoon organization organic to the
battalion instead of the brigade level, as is the case with
the base structure, some general advantages and
disadvantages between both levels will be examined first.
After this discussion the strengths and weaknesses of each
COA will be examined independently and compared against the
base structure.
B. BRIGADE/BATTALION COMPARISON
As already discussed, the base structure is an EFOG-M
company organic to the brigade. Both alternative courses of
action advocate either changing the existing light battalion
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anti-tank platoon or creating a new EFOG-M platoon organic
to the battalion. Deploying the EFOG-M system at battalion
level verses brigade offers some significant advantages.
First, most previous studies concluded that the brigade
was the best level to deploy and fight the system. This was
proposed mainly because the brigade was the lowest level
where all the intelligence information came together
necessary to effectively command and control the EFOG-M
system. However, because of technological advances made
within the last few years and the advent of Force XXI this
is no longer a valid argument. Force XXI will provide the
battalion commander enough critical intelligence information
in real-time to more than effectively command and control
EFOG-M units.
Additionally, past studies argued that the long range
of the EFOG-M logically made it a brigade level asset.
While true at the time most of these studies were conducted,
this is too no longer a valid argument. Force XXI is
reexamining the concepts of the deep and close battle,
battle command, and battle space. The focus of Force XXI is
not just to insert new technologies, but also to redefine
the composition of units and how they doctrinally fight on
the battlefield. TRADOC Pamphelet 525-5 discusses in depth
the deep and close battle, battle command, and battle space.
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It is clear from this document that future units will have
to be smaller, more lethal, and responsible for increased
space on the battlefield. Using this philosophy it
logically makes sense to let the battalion commander fight
the EFOG-M system. Additionally, the 15 KM range of the
system, which will be doctrinally deployed from 2 KM to 8 KM
behind the FLOT, realistically produces a maximum effective
range of 7 KM to 13 KM, not quite a deep weapon system as
defined by today's standards. Clearly with this reduced
range and the new philosophy promulgated in the TRADOC 525
series, the EFOG-M would be more logically fought at the
battalion level.
Another advantage this level of deployment offers is in
the area of intelligence. The battalion commander would be
able to gain extraordinary real-time intelligence each time
a missile is launched. Currently the EFOG-M is the only
weapon system that can provide real-time intelligence
enroute to the target area as well as confirming target
presence in the engagement area. (CEP, p. 1-2 6) This unique
ability will provide the battalion commander the flexibility
to see the target and influence the battle before the enemy
can engage his forces.
The battalion commander and his staff will also be able
to conduct more accurate battle damage assessment while
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engaging enemy forces. The battle damage assessment gained
from the EFOG-M flights can be used to provide tactical
intelligence to the battalion S-2 (intelligence officer).
For example, in this role the EFOG-M could accurately locate
enemy forces, as well as gain information on strength and
composition, just prior to the actual maneuver force's
attack, providing the means for the battalion commander to
time and orient his attack. This intelligence would also
provide the battalion fire support officer (FSO) the real-
time information to coordinate attacks by other fire support
means
.
As already discussed in Chapter III, the brigade is
currently ill suited to train organic units. The battalion
is logically a more effective and efficient organization in
which to train organic units. Closely tied to training is
the concept of habitual relationships. Again, as pointed
out in Chapter III, this was a disadvantage for the base
structure. However, this is not the case for the battalion.
EFOG-M units deployed at the battalion level would be an
integral part of the organization and be able to develop the
crucial relationships necessary to enhance combat
effectiveness
.
Finally the area of logistics provides another
advantage for the battalion over the brigade. It has
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already been shown that the brigade is not best organized to
logistically support an organic EFOG-M company. On the
other hand, the battalion has an established logistical
support system that is extremely responsive and already
organized to provide such support. Although both levels
would require some additional logistical support personnel,
the battalion is more advantageous.
In summary there are numerous advantages that suggest
the battalion is a more effective organization to train,
maintain, and fight EFOG-M units. The added flexibility and
increased combat power that could be provided to the
battalion commander can assist in the implementation of
Force XXI initiatives.
C. COURSE OF ACTION ONE
1 . General
Course of action one is centered around the already
existing anti-armor platoon in the light infantry battalion.
The platoon is organized as part of the headquarters and
headquarters company. The anti-armor platoon consists of
four TOW weapon systems mounted on HMMWV vehicles with two
additional HMMWVs used for command and control. The platoon
is designed to operate in two sections, with each section
consisting of two TOW vehicles and one command and control
vehicle. The light infantry battalion, HHC, and the anti-
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Figure 4. Light Infantry Battalion Organization
COA one is created by removing one TOW section,
consisting of two TOW vehicles and six personnel, from the
anti-tank platoon and by adding one EFOG-M section. The
addition of the EFOG-M section will add two EFOG-M vehicles
and six personnel . Two of that six personnel are two E-7
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controllers added to the platoon headquarters to facilitate
24 hour operations. Figure 5 illustrates the proposed
organization. There is no requirement to add any logistical




















Totals: Personnel (16) HMMWV (6)
TOW (2)
EFOG-M (2)
Figure 5. Proposed Anti-armor Platoon Organization
The only other personnel required may be in the maintenance
area, however existing mechanics should be able to receive
the required training to perform the limited organizational
maintenance that the EFOG-M requires. (NLOS-CA MPR LIA, p.
3-6)
The platoon would operate much as it does now,
providing anti-armor support of the light infantry
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battalion. The main difference is that the battalion
commander would now have the ability to destroy threat armor
vehicles well beyond the TOWs limited line of sight range.
2 . Strengths
The principal strength that this proposed organization
offers is in cost. This cost is associated with personnel
and equipment. This COA will cost substantially less than
the base structure. Also, this COA adds no personnel to the
light infantry battalion's force structure. The anti-armor
platoon's strength would remain fixed at 16 personnel.
Furthermore, there would be the obvious addition of
equipment that is directly associated with the EFOG-M
system, but the platoon's table of organization and
equipment (TO&E) would change little. Overall the
procurement cost could be cut in half. This is due to a
reduction of 50% of the amount of EFOG-M systems required.
In the base structure each brigade would receive 12 EFOG-M
systems, with this COA only 6 systems would be required per
brigade (2 per battalion)
.
How fast rapid deployment forces can move from home
station to a deployment site is critical. Hinged on this is
the amount of sorties required and then available to move
each units personnel and equipment. A serious disadvantage
for the base structure is the additional airlift required
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for the 53 plus personnel, vehicles, and equipment that make
up the EFOG-M company. An advantage for COA one is that
it's implementation requires no additional airlift. In
fact, a battalion in COA one would require the same amount
of aircraft to move it's personnel and equipment as it did
previously. In a period of reduced resources for all
services this becomes a major advantage for COA one.
Another advantage that this course of action offers is
in the ease of implementation. It is difficult to start a
new organization in any unit. This COA negates that
difficulty because it is only adding to an already
established organization. The insertion of one section
would pose much less of a burden than the creation of an
entirely new company. The key is in the battalion's
infrastructure. It is already well established and able to
adequately adjust to this COA. The brigade (the base
structure) , on the other hand, does not currently possess
that capability.
Logistical support is also a strong advantage for this
COA. The battalion's logistical support system is already
in existence and sufficient to handle the anti-armor
platoon's logistical requirements. Because the TOW and
EFOG-M missile are similar in both weight and size there
would be no additional logistical cargo carrying capacity
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required to support the new platoon organization. The
battalion would not have to be provided with any additional
cargo vehicles which is not the case in the base structure.
Also, there would be no change in fuel consumption negating
any requirement for addition POL vehicles. Because the
platoon' s strength remains the same there would be no
requirement for other logistical or support personnel such
as cooks or mechanics (at the organizational level)
.
Finally this COA provides numerous other advantages
over the base structure as previously discussed. These
areas include training, habitual relationships, and ease of
command and control. The base structure also required
addition personnel to run a brigade command and control
cell, this COA would not require any additional personnel in
the battalion TOC. Other key advantages are the increase
in continuous dedicated combat power and the real-time
intelligence that would be available to the battalion




The predominate weakness affiliated with this COA is in
the reduction of potential combat power. While the reduced
number of systems is a strength due to cost savings, it is a
weakness for combat power. This COA would only provide half
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of the EFOG-M systems that the base structure would provide.
Also this COA removes one TOW section per battalion.
However, it is important to note that both this COA and the
base structure increase the battalion's current capability
to destroy threat armor vehicles at increased ranges. There
are definite cost trade-offs associated with this COA. How
much can the Army afford to spend relative to the increase
in combat power is a critical question that will have to be
examined and answered by Army leadership.
4 . Summary
This COA provides an increased combat power to the
light infantry battalion at a significant cost reduction as
compared to the base structure. It also has numerous other
advantages such as the ease of implementation, logistics,
and the need for no additional airlift capacity that the
base structure does not allow. One disadvantage is in the
reduction of potential combat power. This trade-off may be
necessary especially in the fiscally austere period that
characterizes the environment that the Army must operate in
for the foreseeable future.
D. COURSE OF ACTION TWO
1 . General
Course of action two consists of creating a separate
EFOG-M platoon organic to the light infantry battalion.
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This would add an additional platoon to the headquarters and
headquarters company of the battalion. The platoon would be
organized much like the platoon in the base structure,
except that two E-7 controllers would be added to the
platoon headquarters instead of a company headquarters. The
EFOG-M platoon would consist of a platoon headquarters
section and four firing units, for a combined total of 14
personnel. Figure 6 illustrates the platoon organization.
Platoon Leader ( 1
)









Totals: Personnel (14) HMMWV (6)
EFOG-M (2)
Figure 6. Separate EFOG-M Platoon
The battalion's logistical hauling and cargo capacity would
have to be increased to handle this additional requirement.
One cargo truck and the two associated drivers per battalion
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would be sufficient to handle this increase. Also this COA
would require an additional mechanic per battalion to offset
the increase in vehicles.
2 . Strengths
COA two offers many of the same advantages as COA one.
Cost is still an advantage over the base structure because
COA two does not require the company headquarters that the
base structure proposes. The removal of 17 personnel and
all related equipment will save money. Although there are
cost savings associated with the implementation of this COA
they are not as sizable as in COA one.
Logistical support is also an advantage for this COA.
The battalion' s preexisting logistical support system will
require some minor plus-ups in equipment and personnel.
However, they will be slightly less than the base structure.
This COA requires the addition of one cargo truck and two
drivers per battalion, equaling the base structure's
requirement of three trucks (two cargo and one POL) and six
drivers. Although both this COA and the base structure are
similar in the amount of logistical assets that would be
required, this category is considered as a strength
primarily due to the quick logistical response time the
battalion can provide.
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Additional strengths that this COA offers, which have
already been discussed in reference to COA one, include
training and habitual relationships. Again this COA will
provide a more effective training environment and a
consistent habitual relationship when compared against base
structure
.
The last advantage this COA offers over the base
structure is that this COA would require less airlift
capacity. The base structure requires an additional airlift
capacity for the company headquarters section. This
includes airlift for two HMMWV' s, 17 plus personnel, and
related equipment. Because COA two would not have to lift
the company headquarters section this becomes another
advantage when compared to the base structure.
3. Weaknesses
Ease of implementation, an advantage for COA one,
becomes a disadvantage for this COA. It would be as
difficult to establish a new platoon organization at
battalion level as it would in establishing a separate
company at brigade. Therefore, this COA shares a similar




COA two does offer advantages over the base structure.
Most notable are in areas of cost, airlift capacity,
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training, and habitual relationships. COA two also provides
an equal amount of combat power for the brigade when
compared to the base structure, but at a reduced cost. It is
important to note that this COA offers all of the advantages
already discussed that the battalion level provides over the
brigade level. Finally, this COA proves to be a marginal
improvement over the base structure when weighing the
advantages over the disadvantages.
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter first compared an EFOG-M unit, organic to
a battalion, against the base structure which establishes a
separate EFOG-M company organic to the brigade. Comparisons
of two alternative courses of action were then discussed.
Both courses of action advocate the reorganization or
organization of platoon size EFOG-M units at the battalion
level. Advantages and disadvantages were examined for each
course of action and independently compared against the base
structure. Figure 7 provides a summary matrix of advantages
and disadvantages for the base structure and both courses of
action. Chapter V will provide overall conclusions and make
recommendations on which COA, if any, should be considered
by the Army as a more effective way of ensuring the








•Provides intell to brigade
•Adequate availability of intell
information
•Combat Power, provides 12
systems per brigade
•Provides no real-time video intell
to battalion commander
•Highest cost of all options
•Most difficult to implement
•Training
•111 suited to logistically support
•Habitual relationships
•Largest airlift requirement
•Reduced range of system
(25KM vs 15KM)
•Most significant MTOE changes
•Cost, lowest cost COA to
implement
•No additional airlift required
•Little change to MTOE
•Ease of implementation
•Logistical support system in
place
•Correct level to train units
•Provides habitual relationships
•Provides real-time video intell
to battalion commander
•Supports Force XXI initiatives
•Combat power, provides only six
systems per brigade
•Cost, slightly lower cost than
base
•Additional airlift required, but
slightly less than base
•Logistical support system in
place, but will require plus-up
•Correct level to train units
•Provides habitual relationships
•Provides real-time video intell
to battalion commander
•Supports Force XXI initiatives




Figure 7. Summary Advantage/Disadvantage Matrix
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. SUMMARY
This thesis examined the force structure issues
effecting the Enhanced Fiber Optic Guided Missile program.
It began by providing some general background information on
the history of the system. Further background information
was provided on the current threat and proposed force
structure. Following this key studies, that were
instrumental in the development of the proposed force
structure, were discussed. These studies were used to lay
the foundation for the discussion of the strengths and
weaknesses of the current proposed force structure that
followed.
Finally, two alternative force structures were proposed
and then compared individually against the proposed force
structure. Both alternatives advocated a battalion level
EFOG-M organization verses a brigade level, as proposed by
the current force structure. This study attempted to show
why some of the initial assumptions and arguments used to
support a brigade level organization are no longer valid.
Numerous advantages were presented that suggest in the Force
XXI Army of tomorrow, the battalion is the most effective
organization to train, maintain, and fight the EFOG-M
system.
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B. ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1
.
Is the current proposed force structure of the
EFOG-M system the optimal solution and does it maximize the
system's unique and diverse capabilities?
This study showed that the current proposed force
structure is not the optimal solution and does not fully
maximize the system's unique and diverse capabilities. This
is especially true in today's environment which is
characterized by reductions in defense budgets and concepts
espoused in the Force XXI vision. This system can be
deployed at the battalion level at a significant cost
reduction yet still provide an increase in the overall
current battalion combat power. The bottom line is that the
battalion commander will have the ability to effectively
gain real-time intelligence and destroy enemy armored
vehicles at increased ranges, enhancing the combat
capability of the battalion.
2. What is the history of the EFOG-M program?
The EFOG-M, which began in the early seventies, is the
only complete weapon system in the Army' s history which has
been developed through a militarized stage totally by Army
research laboratories. (PM Briefing, p. 3) It's past is
plagued with problems ranging from lack of funding to lack
of interested sponsors. In the early eighties the U.S.
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Army Missile Command conducted several tests that
successfully demonstrated the systems capabilities,
destroying stationary and moving tanks as well as hovering
helicopters. Even with this successful record the program
was canceled. But after the termination of the Sergeant York
Air-defense Weapon system, there was a renewed interest in
exploiting the unique anti-armor and air defense
capabilities the EFOG-M offered.
3. What is the current force structure?
The current proposed force structure of the EFOG-M is
an separate company organic to the brigade. The company
will have a headquarters section and three firing platoons.
Each platoon will have one headquarters section and four
firing sections. This organization will provide twelve
firing systems per brigade. Additional personnel and
logistical requirements are required and were discussed in
detail in Chapter II.
4. What is the current status of the EFOG-M program?
The Enhanced Fiber Optic Guided Missile, is currently
being developed as part of the Rapid Force Projection
Initiative Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (RFPI
ACTD) . The RFPI ACTD will consist of a large scale Advanced
Warfighting Experiment in Fiscal Year (FY) 98 followed by an
extended users evaluation period in FY 99-00. In May of
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1995 the U.S. Army awarded Raytheon Electronic Systems a
$39.5 million contract for the ACTD program with options for
an additional $100 million.
5. Are there feasible alternative force structures,
not previously studied, that may better utilize the
capabilities of the EFOG-M system?
This study examined two possible battalion level
alternative force structures for the EFOG-M. Other past
studies only compared organizational levels, such as
division, brigade, and battalion against each other and did
not examine platoon organizations organic to the battalion.
This was primarily due to the fact that most of the studies
concluded that the brigade was the optimum level to deploy
the EFOG-M system and therefore battalion level
organizations were not explored. It is important to note
that one study, conducted by the present sponsor, the
infantry, advocated battalion control. This thesis has
shown that deploying the EFOG-M as a platoon organic to the
battalion offers many distinct advantages over the current
proposed force structure.
C. RECOMMENDATION
In order for the Army to capitalize on the technology
that the EFOG-M offers it must be able to quickly field the
system to units as part of the RFPI ACTD concept. Because
of this systems variegated history, a significant reduction
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in procurement dollars, and the possible declining level of
enthusiasm on the part of the user it is imperative that the
Army choose an option that it can afford. COA one, a
reorganized anti-armor platoon, gives the Army that
capability. It provides the light infantry battalion the
non-line of sight technology to destroy enemy armored threat
vehicles and other hard targets at long ranges. It also
furnishes this capability for the lowest cost, while COA two
and the base structure are considerably more expensive to
implement. COA one also requires the least number of
changes to a unit's MTO&E. COA two and the base structure
would require numerous changes to existing MTO&Es. Another
major advantage for COA one is that it does not require any
additional airlift capacity. This is because there is no
net increase in vehicles or personnel to the battalion.
However, both COA two and the base structure would require a
significant increase in the amount of aircraft required to
move the additional vehicles and personnel. COA one also
provides numerous other advantages in areas the base
structure does not such as training, logistical support, and
habitual relationships. Finally this COA supports Force XXI
initiatives. It gives the battalion commander the ability to
increase his battle command and space, effectively
increasing the battalion' s lethality, while influencing
larger areas of the battlefield. It is therefore strongly
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recommended that the Army consider changing it's current
plan of deploying the EFOG-M at brigade level and field the
system at battalion level. The Army can field COA one to
light infantry battalions and COA two, a new platoon
organization, to mechanized battalions if that requirement
is still deemed necessary and is within the Army's budget.
D. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
Further research should be conducted on force structure
issues relating to other weapon systems, particularly those
that are in the process of development. Case studies in
this area will allow future program managers, users, and
force developers to better synchronize the process to allow
for a more rapid insertion of promising technologies into
the Army's force structure.
This study has shown that the fielding of a system can
be placed in jeopardy if the user does not have a well
defined plan on how deploy it. Further research should be
conducted to determine the optimal process that can be used
to develop force structures for new weapon systems. This
will help to ensure that new and promising technologies are
not swept under the rug simply because the it could not be
determined who should fight the system and where it should
be fought
.
Finally, the RFPI ACTD concept needs to be studied as
it progresses, to determine if it was successful in
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achieving it's goals and objectives. This new way of
integrating systems into the Army may prove to be
tremendously advantageous, however it may also prove to be a
cause for force structure issues similar to what has been
discussed in this study. For example, if we are not sure
where we want to place a new system and wait for a
technology demonstration to figure it out, it may be too
late in the process possibly threatening a systems survival.
E . CONCLUSIONS
EFOG-M technology offers the Army a unique capability
to provide real-time intelligence and increased combat power
to the battalion commander. Force structure issues, as well
as other factors, have hampered this program. Lack of
funding has canceled this program in the past and remains a
major threat for it's future. The EFOG-M currently fills the
Army's need for an extremely lethal, survivable, yet highly
deployable and flexible system. Force XXI provides the Army
a great opportunity to reexamine it y s structure and how it
will fight. The EFOG-M organization recommended in this
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